Nuclear Weapons and New Security Challenges by Gallagher, Nancy
Nuclear Weapons and New Security Challenges 
  
2002 Cynthia Wedel Distinguished Lecture 
Churches’ Center for Theology and Public Policy 
May 30, 2002 
  
Nancy Gallagher 
University of Maryland 
  
I am delighted to be here tonight with a group that is so distinguished and so welcoming.  
I am especially pleased that Wendy Starman was selected for the Distinguished Service Award.  
Since the end of the Cold War, trying to educate religious groups and other citizen organizations 
about nuclear weapons has often been a thankless task because people would prefer to believe 
that the danger disappeared with the Soviet Union.  So while I hope that Wendy has a few 
blissful months in which nothing else matters but her new baby, I also hope that she returns to 
the cause with renewed energy because she has one more very important reason to reduce 
nuclear weapons, stop proliferation, and prevent nuclear war. 
  
 When Andrew Young delivered the 2001 Wedel lecture, he spoke extensively about the 
relationship between religion, business, and poverty alleviation.  Rarely do security experts 
speak so openly about the relationship between religion and nuclear weapons policy. Too often, 
one’s credibility as a nuclear expert is judged by one’s perceived ability to think about the 
unthinkable in a purely “rational” fashion, without regard to religious beliefs or emotional 
considerations. 
  
 Religious leaders have made strong and influential statements about nuclear weapons at 
critical moments.   The 1983 Pastoral Letter on War and Peace from the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops was released shortly before I started working as a first-year teacher at Our 
Lady Queen of Peace School in Madison Wisconsin.  I found that statement very empowering 
even though I was not a Catholic, and did not even consider myself to be especially religious at 
that time.  It helped channel my own amorphous fears of nuclear war into a more focused plan of 
action.  It provided cogent analysis and moral authority which increased my confidence when I 
spoke about nuclear issues to parents and the principal at my school.  It strengthened my 
commitment to teaching about war and peace in the nuclear age, which is one reason why I 
returned to graduate school and devoted my professional life to nuclear arms control. 
  
 More typically, a different type of theology shapes debates about nuclear weapons.  
When I accompanied General Shalikashvili and Ambassador Goodby to speak with U.S. 
Senators, government officials, and others about the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
we were often told that controversies surrounding the Treaty stemmed from basic “theological 
disagreements.”  Of course, nobody was suggesting that attitudes toward nuclear weapons are 
necessarily determined by people’s religious affiliation.  Instead, they meant that ideas about 
nuclear weapons are heavily influenced by worldviews – i.e. fundamental beliefs about human 
nature and about how people should behave in a world that lacks an overarching secular 
authority. 
  
 Tonight, I want to start by talking about how the interplay between different worldviews 
during the Cold War led to a grand bargain and what is sometimes called the “nuclear restraint 
regime.”  I will say a few words about why the new security challenges that have emerged since 
make a legally based nuclear restraint regime more, not less, important.  I will then make the 
case that the Bush Administration has responded to these new security challenges by 
systematically repudiating the grand bargain and undermining central elements of the nuclear 
restraint regime.  Finally, I will conclude by suggesting that the situation today is much like it 
was in 1983, in that the security policies being pursued by the government are spreading fear, 
increasing hatred, and producing actions that degrade the quality of life as they raise the risk of 
nuclear war.  What is missing now is any serious democratic debate or sustained opposition to 
rhetoric and policies that reflect an extreme version of one worldview and a narrow conception 
of national interests while violating key tenets of other worldviews and more comprehensive 
conceptions of the global good. 
  
  
Worldviews and Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons   
  
 Beliefs about nuclear weapons are heavily influence by abstract worldviews because we 
have little empirical evidence about what makes deterrence work or fail, let alone about the 
consequences of using nuclear weapons in war.  Moreover, nuclear weapons can cause almost 
incomprehensible destruction, so it is hard to relate them to any more familiar form of weapon, 
warfare, or security policy. 
  
 The divergent worldviews that have shaped a half century of nuclear debates have much 
older origins.  They can be traced back to philosophical and religious traditions that shaped the 
earliest arguments about security in a world of sovereign states.   One perspective may dominate 
temporarily, but none has drowned out the other voices for long.   Nor do I believe that any one 
perspective will remain triumphant in the future, for the simple reason that each perspective 
contains some elements of truth and some serious weaknesses. 
  
 Unilateralists are the intellectual descendents of Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth century 
theorist who maintained that life in an anarchic world is necessarily “nasty, brutish, and short.”  
Key elements of this world view are that: 
  
• Humans and states are inherently self-interested and competitive. 
  
• World politics is fundamentally conflictual – it is a zero sum game between “us” 
and “them,” or between “good” and “evil.” 
  
• All politics is about coercive power, and nuclear weapons are the ultimate source 
of coercive power.  They offer potentially unlimited destructive capabilities, but 
are not qualitatively different from other weapons.  They can be used not only for 
deterrence, but also for many other political and military goals. 
  
• Arms control is a dangerous illusion in a world where peace is a pause for 
rearming between wars.  The “bad guys” will cheat, while the “good guys” are 
prevented from taking steps necessary to deter attack or prevail in the next war.  
Symbolic arms control can be useful for public relations purposes, but leaders 
must be careful that it does not lull citizens and allies into reduced vigilance. 
  
Cautious Cooperators are the intellectual descendants of Hugo Grotius, who is known as 
the seventeenth century “father of international law.”  This tradition also includes strong 
elements of Just War Theory, with earlier antecedents in Catholic thought.  Cautious Cooperators 
believe that: 
  
• Humans and states have a mix of common and conflicting interests.  In particular, 
they have common interest in avoiding lengthy, massively destructive wars fueled 
by religious or ideological disagreements.  They can co-exist by agreeing to let 
each sovereign do as he wishes within his own territory, then negotiating rules to 
facilitate interactions among states. 
  
• In the nuclear age, states face an extreme security dilemma.  Most states are 
defensive rather than aggressive, but because they lack a central protector, they 
need arms as insurance against the possibility that somebody else might try to 
exploit them.  Since no other state can be sure that the first state’s aims are purely 
defensive, prudence dictates that they must increase their arms in response.  The 
result is a dangerous and costly arms race that neither side wants, but that is 
difficult to avoid. 
  
• It is possible to have the benefits of nuclear deterrence without excessive costs or 
risks by negotiating agreements to coordinate behavior and minimize unintended 
consequences.  During the Cold War, Cautious Cooperators favored arms control 
to set agreed force levels, stabilize deterrence, and avert proliferation.  
  
 Globalists are the philosophical descendants of Immanuel Kant, who is known best for 
his eighteenth century book, Perpetual Peace.  They believe that: 
  
• Economic interdependence and other mutually beneficial interactions mean that 
people have far more common interests than conflicting ones. 
  
• The world functions as a universal community in which states are important 
players, but scientific experts, business leaders, non-governmental organizations, 
and many other types of non-state actors are also important. 
  
• Military power is ineffective, if not counter-productive, in the pursuit of many 
important goals. 
  
• Nuclear weapons do more to threaten security than they do to protect it.  Most 
globalists assume that there are no real threats to security that cannot be addressed 
as well or better through other means.  They also maintain that the practice of 
deterrence carries high risk that nuclear weapons will eventually be used due to 
escalation during a conventional war, launch in response to a mistaken perception 
of impending attack, or increased proliferation.   
  
• Arms control should be used not only to stabilize deterrence, but also to transform 




The Grand Bargain and the Nuclear Restraint Regime 
  
Proponents of all three world views were influential in public debates and policy 
deliberations over nuclear weapons during the Cold War.  The result was a philosophical “checks 
and balances” system which kept U.S. policy from going too far in any one direction for too 
long.  This produced a type of grand bargain to the effect that U.S. nuclear weapons policy 
should contain three elements which appealed in varying degrees to proponents of the three 
worldviews: 
  
1. Nuclear weapons are needed for deterrence, at least in the short term. 
  
2. The United States should be a proponent for progressive mutual restraint 
to slow, then reverse, the superpower arms race and to avert proliferation. 
  
3. The long term objective is a transformed world in which nuclear weapons 
are no longer necessary and everyone enjoys a stable, just peace. 
  
Negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union (which had counter-balancing 
power), and various other countries, many of which also had their own internal debates and 
uneasy compromises, produced the nuclear restraint regime – a patchwork of more or less formal 
agreements that played an important role in keeping the Cold War cold and minimizing 
proliferation: 
  
• The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is essentially a bargain 
between those countries that already had nuclear weapons and those that did not. 
The Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties promised not to acquire nuclear 
weapons if the Nuclear Weapons States Parties promised to share peaceful 
nuclear technology and to negotiate in good faith on the reduction and ultimate 
elimination of nuclear weapons. 
  
• The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty acknowledged that any attempt to defend 
against nuclear weapons could be easily overcome by offensive counter-measures. 
It underscored that ballistic missile defense should only be by mutual agreement 
and should be linked to agreed limits on offensive capabilities. 
  
• The SALT and START accords, which capped, and then reduced, offensive 
strategic weapons and reshaped arsenals to reduce first-strike incentives. 
  
• The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which outlawed all nuclear 
explosions.  Negotiating this Treaty was a key element in the political bargain that 
secured the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.  It increases the scientific 
challenges facing proliferators, especially ones that want not just basic fission 
weapons but also more powerful and efficient designs.  It also forecloses the 
possibility of third-generation nuclear weapons, such as nuclear x-ray lasers and 
enhanced radiation weapons. 
  
These and numerous other agreements reinforced the global norm that nuclear weapons 
are fundamentally different from other weapons, that they should be governed by special rules, 
and that they should be used only as a last resort, if at all.  Although this norm is not embodied in 
a formal treaty, the “nuclear taboo” and the associated imperative to preserve a very high, clear 
threshold between conventional and nuclear weapons, form a fifth important component of the 
nuclear restraint regime. 
  
  
New Security Challenges Increase Importance of Cooperative Nuclear Restraint 
  
The end of the Cold War removed the fear of a massive attack by the Soviet Union as the 
central threat around which the United States could organize its security policy.  It also left the 
United States as the sole remaining superpower with no peer competitor to provide a near-
automatic check on U.S. exercises of power. 
  
The first ten years of the new era brought no agreement on organizing principles for U.S. 
security policy.  The proponents of the three worldviews had very different ideas about the 
nature of the new security environment and the implications for U.S. nuclear policies.  With the 
superpower confrontation over and the fear of nuclear war receding, there seemed to be no 
urgent need for action.  So most people turned their attention to other issues and tolerated a 
situation where forward movement on each element of the nuclear restraint regime was blocked 
by a few committed unilateralists who opposed any constraints on U.S. nuclear might. 
  
Political paralysis inside the Beltway did not stop the world from changing; it just 
stopped the United States from adapting its policies in response to changes wrought by critical 
trends associated with globalization.  I will only touch briefly on some of these trends tonight.   
Anyone who wants to know more should read Principles of Global Security by John Steinbruner, 
my colleague at the University of Maryland.1 
  
• Decades of rapid population growth.  The world currently has over 7 billion 
inhabitants, and the number will probably rise by several billion more before it 
stabilizes in the next century.  It is important to note that 97% of that population 
growth is occurring at the lowest income levels. 
  
• Rapid advances in information technology are making it possible for economics, 
politics, and socio-cultural movements to operate on a global scale in near-real 
time. 
  
• Breakthroughs in other fields, such as biotechnology, offer tremendous life-saving 
and life-enhancing benefits to those that can afford them, but also make it possible 
for a small group of people or a weak state to acquire tremendous destructive 
power using materials and knowledge that is widely available around the world. 
  
• The economic benefits of globalization are very unevenly distributed.  A United 
Nations Development Program study found that in 1970, the income of the richest 
fifth of the world’s population was thirty-two times that of the poorest fifth.  If 
current trends continue, the disparity between the top and bottom fifths will be 
100 fold by 2025 and nearly 200 fold by 2050.2 
  
 These long-term trends have important implications for security policy.  On the one hand, 
there is less reason to worry about a massive deliberate attack from a clearly defined peer 
competitor.  On the other hand, there is more reason to be concerned about diffuse threats that 
are difficult to anticipate or identify.  Furthermore, we need to pay attention not only to the 
possibility that a terrorist group or small hostile state will deliberately launch an “asymmetrical 
attack” against the United States, but also to the potentially catastrophic unintended 
consequences of individual actions in a world where things are tightly wired together, happen 
nearly instantaneously, and involve immensely powerful technologies. 
  
 The changing nature of threats requires a corresponding transformation of security policy.  
In a global world, defense of territory is less important than defense of legal order.   Nobody is 
seriously worried that terrorists or hostile states will try to seize and govern New York or 
Washington, D.C.  Instead, we fear that they will use small scale attacks or weapons of mass 
destruction to sow panic; disrupt financial, communication, and transportation systems; and 
cause widespread disorder or a suspension of civil liberties.  Laws and less formal 
understandings about appropriate behavior are essential to the smooth functioning of market 
systems and democratic politics inside states.  They are increasingly important worldwide as 
economics, politics, and culture occurs on a global scale.   
  
 In a world of diffuse dangers, misperceptions and mistakes could be as destructive as 
deliberate attacks.   Security policies should place more emphasis on reassurance and systematic 
prevention of dangerous situations, not just deterrence or contingency response after another, 
potentially much more devastating attack.  The objectives of arms control also need to be 
broadened from quantitative limits and access controls to include more refined agreements about 
appropriate activities with dangerous dual-use technologies. 
  
 As U.S. military planners have already recognized, adroit management of information is 
now more important than firepower.  The information revolution can be exploited for 
cooperative ends by creating sophisticated ways to verify that disclosed information is correct 
and complete, plus reliable arrangements to ensure that information which is revealed for 
cooperative purposes does not compromise security or hurt commercial interests.  
  
 We also need stronger, more trusted international institutions that can work effectively 
with national governments and non-state actors.   These institutions need the resources and 
expertise to create incentives for cooperation and to help countries that want to follow the rules, 
but lack the capacity to do so.  They also need the authority and power to help organize the 
international community for an effective response should violations threaten global security. 
  
  
Current U.S. Policy Undermines Cooperative Nuclear Restraint 
  
 The changes to security policy that I have just outlined are clearly not what Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld has in mind when he speaks about military transformation.  For the first 
eight months of new administration, a rough balance existed between the Unilateralist faction led 
by Secretary Rumsfeld and the Cautious Cooperator faction led by Secretary of State Powell.  
The Bush administration relied heavily on vague rhetoric that would appeal for different reasons 
to different parts of the political spectrum, such as calling for a new security framework based on 
“more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us.”3  There were 
several intense internal policy debates over nuclear arms control issues, but in each instance, the 
Administration stopped short of decisive decisions that only Unilateralists would favor, such as 
announcing an intent to abrogate the ABM Treaty or ending all U.S. funding for the organization 
charged with building the Test Ban Treaty monitoring system.   The vague rhetoric and internal 
policy compromises kept open the prospect that the Bush administration would muddle along 
and end up reproducing the stalemate that characterized nuclear policy debates during the 
Clinton years. 
  
 The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks changed all that.  
They underscored that we are operating in a new security environment.  They restored a strong 
sense of urgency: with another attack potentially imminent, a continuation of the security 
stalemate was no longer acceptable, regardless of whether that stalemate resulted from legitimate 
differences in world views or partisan politics.  Cautious Cooperators and Globalists hoped that 
the Bush administration would adopt a more multilateral approach to security policy because the 
war on terrorism required other countries’ cooperation for practical purposes such as intelligence 
sharing and basing rights.  They also hoped it might generate a broader recognition that members 
of the “civilized world” needed to accommodate each others’ interests in order to present a 
united front against terror. 
  
 Although the Bush administration used a fair amount of multilateralist rhetoric, it insisted 
that it would and could act unilaterally whenever international support was not forthcoming.  In 
December 2001, President Bush gave notice that the United States would withdraw from the 
ABM Treaty even though Russia and NATO allies still valued that accord and considered it to be 
compatible with the logical next stages of U.S. work on missile defense.  A series of such actions 
suggest that Unilateralists in the Bush administration decided to take advantage of a time when 
domestic critics were remaining silent for the sake of national unity and when most other 
countries also wanted to show solidarity with the United States. 
  
 Current U.S. security policy is framed in essentially Unilateralist terms.  Top officials 
depict the war against terrorism as a zero sum conflict between good and evil, in which other 
countries are either “with us or against us.”  There is no effort to see others’ perspectives or to 
consider that they might have legitimate grievances; anyone who attempts to do so is denounced 
as an apologist for the attackers.  Likewise, there is no room for compromise or accommodation 
in dealing with terrorists or rogue states. 
  
 The Administration’s huge increases in defense spending are premised on the belief that 
U.S. security necessitates “full spectrum military dominance” -- i.e. the ability, operating alone 
or with allies, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the range of military 
operations.   Defense planners assume that military superiority can be used to accomplish a wide 
range of ambitious objectives.  For example, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review specifies 
that the U.S. military must be able to dissuade future competitors, deter threats and coercion, and 
decisively defeat any adversary – including imposing a change of regime if the President orders.4   
  
 Despite military and intelligence capabilities that dwarf those of any other country, top 
Administration officials assert that our enemies are so highly motivated to harm the United 
States that they will “inevitably” acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.  Tighter export 
controls might complicate efforts to acquire dangerous materials, while improved intelligence 
sharing might disrupt some planned operations.  Rather than placing increased emphasis on 
preventive measures, though, the Administration stresses their inadequacies and favors 
contingency response through counter-proliferation, pre-emption, defense, and preparations to 
manage the consequences of a WMD attack. 
  
 Although the Administration voices support for existing non-proliferation accords, it 
operates from the premise that the United States should not be bound by any agreement that 
interferes with self-defense.  Its November 2001 decision to repudiate long-standing international 
efforts to add a verification and enforcement protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention, like its subsequent rejection of the ABM Treaty, stem from the Unilateralists’ 
opposition to anything that prevents the United States from taking full advantage of its military, 
economic, and scientific prowess.  Although the Administration often depicts arms control as an 
“outmoded relic of the Cold War,” the basic objection is one that Unilateralists have used for 
decades: arms control constrains the “good guys” without reducing the dangers they face because 
the “bad guys” either remain outside the regime, or join for political cover while they cheat.  
  
 The Bush administration sees no need to preserve the grand bargain because it thinks that 
no one at home or abroad can currently mount an effective challenge to purely Unilateralist 
policies.   In effect, it wants to broaden the first element of grand bargain, such that nuclear 
weapons become necessary not only for deterrence, but also for a range of other political and 
military goals.  It wants to weaken the second element by moving from advocacy for progressive 
mutual restraint to supporting one round of reciprocal unilateral reductions, undertaken if and 
when the United States decides the time is right, with no expectation of further reductions.   It 
has largely repudiated the third element, and no longer even pays lip service to the idea that the 
United States should be actively working toward a world free of nuclear weapons, where a stable 
and just peace depends on something other than having a benign hegemon impose it through 
military and economic superiority. 
  
 The Bush administration also appears to be working systematically to dismantle the 
nuclear restraint regime – at least as it applies to the United States: 
  
• Strategic Defense – U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will take effect on 
June 13, 2002.  The Administration has shown no interest in developing an 
alternative legal framework to help countries pursue missile defenses without 
threatening each others’ legitimate security interests and provoking a dangerous 
counter-reaction.  Instead, it has offered vague reassurances about wanting only a 
“limited” system that will not undermine Russia’s deterrent and being willing to 
cooperate on some aspects of the program. 
  
• Strategic Offense – The press has been referring to the recent agreement between 
Presidents Bush and Putin as the “Treaty of Moscow” because the two sides could 
not agree on what the accord should be called.   The name that the Administration 
is using  – the “Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty” -- has the acronym of 
SORT, which is embarrassingly appropriate given that this is only sort of a treaty 
and only sort of arms control.  Administration spokespeople are depicting the 
accord as a historic breakthrough, but in reality: 
  
It is barely legally binding.  There are no requirements for reductions on a fixed 
schedule.  The only obligation is to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 
no more than 2200 on December 31st, 2012, the day when the Treaty expires 
unless extended by mutual consent.  At any point before then, either side can 
withdraw after 90 days notice. 
  
The numbers do not represent real reductions below what the Clinton 
administration had hoped to achieve.  The difference between 2200 and START 
III’s proposed upper limit of 2500 reflects an accounting gimmick of excluding 
nuclear warheads based on submarines that are in port. 
  
The Treaty does not require the dismantlement of any weapons.  In moving from 
the START I limit of 6000 accountable deployed strategic warheads to the future 
limit of 2200 accountable deployed strategic warheads, the Administration plans 
to put most, if not all, of the excess warheads into a responsive force that can be 
quickly reloaded onto existing delivery systems, as well as an inactive stockpile 
that could be returned to operational status if needed.5  
  
The Treaty provides no new verification measures.  By stating that START I will 
remain in force in accordance with its terms, the new Treaty preserves the earlier 
accord’s verification provisions only through 2009, when START I will expire 
unless extended by mutual agreement.  
  
The Treaty represents backwards movement from major accomplishments of 
START II.  By failing to mention START II, the new Treaty reflects a tacit 
agreement to let Russia reduce the cost of keeping large numbers of strategic 
warheads by continuing to place multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, something considered highly destabilizing during the Cold War.  
Important verification provisions will also be lost.  Russian ratification of START 
II depended on full U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already indicated that it will withdraw from 
START II when the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty. 
  
• The Test Ban Treaty is in severe trouble.   The Bush Administration has never 
supported this Treaty, but has not yet nullified U.S. signature as it did for the 
accord establishing the International Criminal Court.   The Administration says 
that it has no immediate plans to end the ten-year-old moratorium on U.S. nuclear 
testing.  However, its Nuclear Posture Review discussed test resumption not only 
to ensure the reliability of the existing stockpile, but also to develop new types of 
nuclear weapons to attack hardened and deeply buried targets or to neutralize 
biological weapons without spreading radioactive fallout over large distances.6  
The Administration wants to improve “test site readiness” – i.e. to shorten the 
time between a Presidential decision to resume testing and a fully instrumented 
explosion.  However, it is hard to distinguish between efforts to increase test site 
readiness and evidence that someone is conducting secret nuclear explosions 
instead of the sub-critical experiments that both U.S. and Russia routinely use to 
preserve stockpile reliability.  The Washington Times often carries allegations of 
Russian cheating at their test site in Novaya Zemlya. Russian officials routinely 
deny that they are doing anything more than sub-critical experiments, which are 
not prohibited by the Test Ban Treaty.  The most recent exchange involved a new 
development.  A senior Russian Atomic Energy Ministry Official reiterated 
Russian compliance with the Test Ban Treaty, but justified activities at Novaya 
Zemlya as necessary to make sure the infrastructure and experts at the test range 
are “fully prepared to conduct full-blown nuclear tests” should a political decision 
be made to do so.7   
  
• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is at risk.  At the Spring 2002 meeting to 
prepare for the NPT Review Conference in 2005, there was mounting frustration 
about policy developments by the Nuclear Weapons States, particularly the 
United States, that are inconsistent with the NPT and the political commitments 
made at the Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000.  Nobody wanted to press their 
concerns very hard this year, either because they felt that it would be wasted 
effort or they feared appearing like a disloyal ally or a terrorist sympathizer.  
Outside the formal meetings, though, there were angry comments by states that 
felt cheated, and growing concern that dissatisfaction with the NPT review 
process could erode confidence in the wider nuclear restraint regime.8 
  
• The Nuclear Taboo – Although the Bush Administration claims that it is trying 
to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons by developing alternatives to deterrence 
– i.e. missile defenses and precision-guided conventional weapons, its actions 
may have the opposite effect.  Saying that 2200 deployed strategic warheads is the 
lowest possible number consistent with the security of the world’s strongest 
conventional power is no way to tell weaker states that nuclear weapons are not 
useful. By blurring distinctions between nuclear and conventional weapons, the 
Administration is effectively lowering the nuclear threshold.  Even if it ultimately 
decides not to develop or test new types of nuclear weapons, loose talk about the 
potential utility of nuclear weapons can seriously weaken the nuclear taboo. 
  
 The sum of these actions suggests that the Bush administration is following a classic 
Unilateralist strategy of using symbolic arms control to lull the U.S. public and its allies while 
the country rearms. 
  
  
The Need to Resume Debate, Restore Balance, and Return to Nuclear Restrain 
  
 Why does it matter if the United States wants to withdraw support from the nuclear 
restraint regime as long as the Cold War is over and the chances for a massive nuclear exchange 
are slim?  At least four arguments against nuclear complacency come quickly to mind: 
  
1. If the threat that justified huge arsenals is gone, then it is no longer rational or morally 
acceptable to run any risk that large numbers of nuclear weapons maintained on 
ready-alert status might be launched due to a mistaken perception of attack, a 
computer malfunction, or any other scenario for inadvertent nuclear war between the 
United States and Russia. 
  
2. Our first line of defense against terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological weapons 
is to safeguard the security of Russian nuclear weapons and materials.  The United 
States is engaged in cooperative threat reduction programs with Russia, but the 
problem could be addressed much more systematically and effectively if undertaken 
in the context of equitable agreements that require the verified dismantlement of 
strategic weapons and address tactical nuclear weapons. 
  
3. India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed states, stand on the brink of war over 
Kashmir.  Both countries are using belligerent language and the Pakistani press 
alleges that both countries have moved tactical nuclear warheads close to the line of 
control.  Neither seems fully aware of the devastation that could be caused by a 
nuclear war.  For example, India claims to have shelters that could protect 30 people 
from WMD agents for up to 96 hours, but U.S. intelligence estimates that a full-scale 
nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan could kill 12 million people immediately 
and injure 7 million more.  The United States is reportedly making plans to evacuate 
1000 U.S. troops and 63,000 U.S. citizens from the region, if necessary.  Of course, 
neither side wants nuclear war, but neither is yet willing to forego the bargaining 
leverage that they think will come from increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in 
the current crisis. 
  
4. In addition to these immediate dangers, there are also real reasons to be concerned 
about what changes in U.S. nuclear policy could do to our political and military 
relationship with China.  Over the longer term, one should also worry about the 
damaging effects on global security if countries like Japan lose faith in the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the larger nuclear restraint regime. 
  
 It is possible to change course and return to cooperative nuclear restraint as the guiding 
principle for security policy.  The underlying problem is that the United States has such 
disproportionate economic and military power that no other country feels it can afford to raise 
strong public objections.  I had hoped that Russia might refuse to legitimate U.S. withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty and U.S. plans to retain a nuclear arsenal far larger than anything Russia 
can afford, but I understand why President Putin concluded that holding out for a more equitable 
agreement would not be a prudent course of action.   
  
 I was in a recent discussion with some Scandinavian defense officials where the 
American arms control supporters expressed hope that Denmark would withhold approval for 
U.S. use of an ABM radar in Greenland until the Bush Administration provided firmer 
reassurances about limits on missile defense and other steps to address Russian and Chinese 
concerns.  Only later did I realize what a sad day it is when citizens of the strongest country on 
earth feel that they cannot influence their over government directly, but must ask little Denmark 
to stand up on their behalf. 
  
 We each need to do what we can to revive democratic debate about security principles 
and policies.  We must restore philosophical checks and balances to make sure that the United 
States exercises self-control.  We cannot expect any other country to do it for us unless we wait 
for U.S. unilateralism to provoke an extreme counter-reaction. 
  
 Given the importance of worldviews in shaping nuclear policy, religious leaders who 
think long and hard about the fundamental questions of life have as much expertise to contribute 
as do weapons scientists or security experts.  It may actually be easier for you to speak up and be 
heard without being accused of being unpatriotic or seeking partisan advantage. 
  
 It is essential to reiterate why any use of nuclear weapons remains unacceptable even 
though it might not lead to full scale nuclear war.  It is equally important to provide a positive 
vision, along with concrete benchmarks for progress toward a world where peace depends not on 
nuclear weapons, but on cooperative mechanisms for mediating conflicts and meeting human 
needs. 
  
 Tonight there are many people in this country and around the world who are like the first-
year teacher that I was in the mid-1980s … scared; convinced in an inarticulate fashion that my 
life need not inevitably be nasty, brutish, and short; and eager for people who were older and 
wiser than I to provide both a vision of a better world and a conviction that each individual can 
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